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Mandle, Jon, and Reidy, David A., eds. A Companion to Rawls.
Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2014. Pp. 587. $199.95 ðclothÞ.
John Rawls apparently once said the following to his moral philosophy students:
“It is easy to kill a subject by demanding too much of it early on: a subject needs
to be guided by big intuitive ideas, particularly at the start” ð9Þ.
Rawls’s own big ideas continue to attract many. Perhaps the single most im-
portant big idea that underlies and has guided his work over many decades is
that normative political claims—for example, claims about justice or legitimacy—
require a distinctive method of justification. In his presidential address to the
APA in 1973, Rawls expressed this idea in terms of a call for the independence of
“moral theory” from other areas of philosophy such as epistemology and meta-
physics. ðRawls must have taken a very dim view of the metaethics of his time.Þ The
call was fueled by skepticism about the possibility of invoking moral truth in the
justification of normative claims, especially in the political domain. The skepticism
is epistemic, not metaphysical—Rawls in no way denies the existence of moral and
religious truths, and it is clear that he takes people’s moral and religious feelings
very seriously. Nor does this epistemic skepticism degenerate into some form of
nihilism—the view that becausemoral truth is not available, nothing reallymatters.
Epistemic skepticism did not deter Rawls’s great optimism about the possibility of
a society effectively regulated by principles of justice.
While Rawls’s big ideas continue to attract, they also divide political philos-
ophers. Some have found his ideas enormously fruitful, as testified by a large
and still growing body of work in Rawlsian political philosophy. Others, however,
have rejected Rawls’s project wholesale. Perfectionists object that Rawls’s pro-
posed “epistemic abstinence” ðRazÞ cannot work and that moral truths thus need
to be brought back into the justification of normative political claims. Others—
notably those in the libertarian camp—object that Rawls’s theory of justice as
fairness does not go far enough in its respect for individual values and that his
optimism about justice stretches too far.
A Companion to Rawls is primarily aimed at those working in the Rawlsian
tradition. As the editors—David Reidy and Jon Mandle—state in their intro-
duction, its main purpose is to provide “a serviceable roadmap for current and
future work on Rawls” ð1Þ.
The Companion is divided into six parts and thirty-one chapters. Part 1, with
the title “Ambitions,” includes a fascinating chapter by Reidy tracing the origins
of Rawls’s big ideas to his writings as an undergraduate and graduate student at
Princeton. Part 2 of the Companion is dedicated to Rawls’s methodological con-
tributions, the area in which we find Rawls’s most influential innovations: the
reflective equilibrium method, the original position thought experiment, and
the idea of ðpoliticalÞ constructivism. Anthony Laden discusses the relationship
between the reflective equilibrium method and constructivism, unfortunately
from a somewhat idiosyncratic angle. Jon Mandle’s chapter focuses on the orig-
inal position. The great merit of his chapter is that, like Reidy’s, it looks at how
Rawls’s thinking has developed over time.
While the original position makes its first appearance in Rawls’s writings only
in 1963, Rawls’s concern with the justification of normative practical claims al-
ready takes center stage in his 1950 PhD thesis “A Study in the Grounds of Eth-
Book Reviews 591
This content downloaded from 217.112.157.113 on April 26, 2016 01:56:20 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
ical Knowledge.” There, Rawls compared “authoritarian” and “positivistic” ethical
theories—today we would probably say non-naturalist realist and expressivist—and
rejected them for the lack of guidance that they offer given the practical nature of
moral reasoning. The first is overly dogmatic and the second too skeptical, even
nihilist. As Mandle shows, the solution to the problem that Rawls was grappling
with in his PhD thesis already draws on elements of the reflective equilibrium
method, the original position, and the idea of constructivism.
Larry Krasnoff’s excellent chapter traces the development of Rawls’s con-
structivism over time. In A Theory of Justice ðTJ Þ, Krasnoff explains, a theory is
called constructive if it proposes “criteria for ordering a plurality of practical
claims” ð76Þ. This understanding of constructivism is compatible with a range
of theories about the grounds of normative judgments. As Rawls acknowledges
in TJ, utilitarianism, too, is a constructivist theory in this first sense. In his later
writings, beginning with the Dewey Lectures, Rawls makes the stronger claim
that is commonly associated with constructivism today, namely that the grounds
of ðsomeÞ normative judgments are themselves constructed, that is, dependent
on our practical deliberation.
Constructivism in this second sense is compatible with amoral interpretation
and with Rawls’s political interpretation. Moral constructivism is a theory of the
grounds of moral judgments at large. It involves a metaphysical claim about
the substantive irrealism of moral truths: moral truths do not exist attitude-
independently, but are the outcome of our practical deliberation. Rawls does not
endorse this metaphysical claim. But, Krasnoff argues, Rawls’s political con-
structivism is nevertheless distinctively Kantian insofar as, in the political domain
at least, it regards the constructivist method as not only necessary but also suffi-
cient for the justification of normative claims.
This interpretation of Rawls’s political constructivism, correct, in my view,
can be contrasted not just with moral constructivism but also with moral realism.
Non-naturalist realists such as Derek Parfit and Tim Scanlon have turned to the
reflective equilibrium method as a way to overcome the age-old epistemological
challenge that non-naturalist realism faces. The thought is that the reflective
equilibrium method, consisting in going back and forth in the comparison
between considered normative judgments, normative principles, and normative
theories, offers a nonmysterious answer to the question of how normative claims
are justified. But while moral realists can consistently argue that reflective
equilibrium is necessary for justified normative claims, they cannot accept that
this—or any other—constructivist method is ever sufficient, in any normative
domain. As Scanlon also realizes, for a realist such as him, “the question one asks
cannot be ‘Will this judgment be among those I arrive at if I reached reflective
equilibrium?’ The question is rather ‘Is this judgment correct?’” ðBeing Realistic
about Reasons ½Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 103Þ. For Rawls, it is, of
course, precisely the former that is decisive—at least for the justification of polit-
ical claims.
The idea of political constructivism came to fruition in Rawls’s second book,
Political Liberalism ðPL; New York: Columbia University Press, 1993Þ. Further
chapters that discuss this idea and related issues can be found in part 4 of the
Companion, dedicated to that book. They include Aaron James’s chapter on
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political constructivism and Jonathan Quong’s on public reason. These chapters
provide summaries of the authors’ earlier writings on these topics.
Rex Martin’s chapter discusses another of Rawls’s iconic ideas—the over-
lapping consensus. The overlapping consensus addresses the worry that the
agreement reached in the original position will not support a well-ordered so-
ciety—Rawls’s term for a society effectively regulated by principles of justice. If,
however, there is sufficient support for the principles of justice from the stand-
point of the comprehensive moral and religious doctrines that people are
committed to, a well-ordered society starts to look possible. On this view, shared
by many Rawls scholars, the overlapping consensus appears primarily as a solu-
tion to the problem of stability, not the problem of justification. Martin’s chapter
helpfully teases out the stability component and the justification component in
the overlapping consensus idea and defends the importance of the justification
component in relation to Rawls’s concern with “stability for the right reasons.”
Stability for the right reasons is also the focus of Gerald Gaus’s insightful
chapter. Gaus introduces a subtle yet very important distinction between a
population-level interpretation of the overlapping consensus and an individu-
alized version. On the first interpretation, the central question is whether the
values picked out by the principles of justice can be expected to be pervasive
enough in society to guarantee stability. On this interpretation, the overlapping
consensus takes the place of the thin theory of the good that Rawls put forward
in part 3 of TJ ðhelpfully discussed in Hill’s chapterÞ. The second interpretation,
while appearing already in the 1993 edition of PL, becomes more dominant in
the 1996 paperback edition of PL. On this interpretation, the justification of a
conception of justice proceeds over three steps: first, justification from the point
of view of the original position, second, “full” justification from the point of view
of each individual in light of their comprehensive moral or religious doctrines,
and, finally, public justification which aims at the endorsement of the shared
political conception of justice by each citizen in light of their comprehensive
doctrines. If full public justification, thus understood, is successful, it supports a
conception of justice that will be stable for the right reasons.
In the final section of his chapter, Gaus links the move to an individualized
interpretation of the overlapping consensus to the shift from justice to legiti-
macy that one can observe in Rawls’s writings over time. Greater awareness of the
depth of the reasonable pluralism that one finds in a democratic society, Gaus
suggests, led the later Rawls to give up on justice as fairness and to adopt a view
that one might call justice as legitimacy ðmy termÞ.
Gaus is right that Rawls’s understanding of what justifies normative po-
litical claims has shifted over time. But it would be wrong to collapse the dis-
tinction between justice and legitimacy, as they apply to different domains. In
Rawls’s theory of justice, the two principles of justice as fairness apply to the
basic structure—society’s main political, economic, and social institutions. The
requirementsof legitimacy, by contrast, apply in thefirst instance to “constitutional
essentials” and matters of basic justice,” that is, to that subset of the institutions of
the basic structure that establish how a society is governed. Only the first princi-
ple, the principle of equal basic rights and liberties, is applicable to that domain.
Legitimacy is thus a weaker idea than justice, and the requirements of legitimacy
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may be met when the requirements of justice are not ðJohn Rawls, “Political Lib-
eralism: Reply to Habermas,” Journal of Philosophy 92 ½1995: 175Þ. Weaker does
not mean less important, of course. In fact, Rawls regards the justification of the
main political institutions as being of “the greatest urgency” ðPL, 227Þ in societies
marked by deep pluralism. Understanding the relationship between justice and
legitimacy in this way explains why Rawls, in his later writings, shifts the emphasis
to legitimacy in response to worries about the possibility of a shared conception
of justice: the requirements of legitimacy, while important, are less demanding
than the requirements of justice.
Understanding justice and legitimacy as related in this way also provides an
answer to the question that StevenWall raises in his chapter. Wall asks: “Can a just
Rawlsian society fail to be legitimate?” ð414Þ. If this question is understood to
refer to both Rawls’s theory of justice and his theory of political legitimacy, the
answer is a clear no, as the relationship between justice and legitimacy is a
constitutive one. What establishes justice also establishes legitimacy. And while
legitimacy is possible without justice, a just society in Rawls’s sense cannot fail to
be legitimate ðsee also PL, 137 n. 5Þ. If one rejects justice as fairness in favor of
some perfectionist account, however, justice may no longer demand public
justification, and this would break the constitutive link between justice and
democratic legitimacy. Wall seems to suggest that the lack of public justification
is a small price to pay en route to the promised land of perfectionist normative
truths about justice. But as long as the epistemic worries that Rawls raised remain
unanswered, this is not an attractive route. In addition, my hunch is that any
moral epistemology that is robust enough to support normative principles for
the political domain will give some weight to public justification.
Part 3 of the Companion is dedicated to A Theory of Justice, Rawls’s first and
most famous book. The chapter with the greatest philosophical sparkle in this
section is Robert S. Taylor’s essay on “The Priority of Liberty.” Rawls controver-
sially claimed that the first principle of justice as fairness should have lexical
priority over the second principle of justice—concerned with issues of distrib-
utive justice—and any other considerations. The chapter considers three argu-
ments that Rawls gives in support of his controversial claim. Taylor argues that
two prominent arguments—the argument from self-respect and the argument
from equal liberty of conscience—fail. They leave justice as fairness vulnerable to
the dogmatism charge that has often been raised against the priority of liberty. A
third argument, however—Taylor calls it the hierarchy argument—can be made
to work. The hierarchy argument defends the priority of the first principle in
relation to their role in securing the conditions for the development and exercise
of rationality. The problem, Taylor argues, is that while this argument secures
the role that Rawls wants to attribute to the first principle, it does so by effectively
endorsing a Kantian conception of the person, one that privileges persons’
rational autonomy. Taylor thus concludes that Rawlsians have to confront the fol-
lowing dilemma: either give up on the priority of liberty or endorse the Kantian
conception of the person and, with that, a comprehensive moral doctrine.
There may, however, be a way out of this dilemma that Taylor hasn’t con-
sidered. Krasnoff’s argument I discussed earlier is helpful in this regard. Ac-
cording to Krasnoff, what Rawls borrows from Kantian constructivism is not a
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commitment to the substantive value of autonomy that can only belong to a
comprehensive moral doctrine. Instead, it is the procedural role that autonomy
plays in a constructivist theory of the justification of normative claims, at least
in the political domain. Since Taylor’s hierarchy argument, too, focuses on the
procedural role of autonomy, the second horn of his dilemma begins to look
quite harmless: the priority of liberty can be supported provided one accepts
what Rawls calls the political conception of persons, according to which persons
“regard themselves as self-authenticating sources of valid claims” ðPL, 32Þ, at least
when it comes to matters of justice in a democratic society.
Part 5 of the Companion is dedicated to Rawls’s last main book, The Law of
Peoples. This part is especially to be welcomed, as the otherwise excellentCam-
bridge Companion to Rawls does not cover Rawls’s Law of Peoples and related re-
search on global justice. Global justice has been one of the most active fields in
political philosophy in recent years. This part of theCompanion is, unfortunately,
relatively thin, and much more could have been done to engage with those
recent developments. This said, it includes some first-rate chapters. Gillian Brock
very helpfully situates Rawls’s theory of human rights in the broader debate on
this topic. It also includes a highly interesting chapter by Darrel Moellendorf
on just war theory—not an area usually associated with Rawls’s work.
Some of my favorite chapters of this Companion are gathered in the last part,
entitled “Conversations with Other Perspectives.” I learned a great deal from the
excellent chapters by Jonathan Riley on Rawls and John Stuart Mill, by Kenneth
Baynes on Rawls and Juergen Habermas, by Daniel Little on Rawls’s relationship
to economics, and by S. A. Lloyd on Rawls’s approach to the history of political
philosophy. But two chapters truly stand out in this part. The first is Barbara
Fried’s lucid and wonderfully crafted chapter on Rawls and libertarianism. It
considers what Rawls would have said if his focus had been, not on the rebuttal
of utilitarianism, but on the rebuttal of libertarianism. Fried argues that Rawls’s
theory of justice offers answers to questions that libertarians must confront
as well—for example, questions about the normative starting point for a proce-
dural theory of justice. The likely answers to those questions, Fried contends,
would move the libertarian theory of justice closer to Rawls’s. Paul Guyer’s bril-
liant chapter focuses on Rawls’s main objection to utilitarianism—that it neglects
the separateness of persons. Guyer argues that the contrast between a Kantian
deontological theory and a utilitarian teleological theory tends to be overdrawn,
including by Rawls. Teleological and deontological elements can be found on
both sides of the alleged divide. Guyer first shows that Rawls wrongly traced what
he saw as utilitarianism’s main flaw to the impartial spectator theory developed
by Adam Smith and David Hume. That theory has more resources to give priority
to justice than Rawls allows. Vice versa, Guyer argues, both Rawls and Kant rely
more heavily on teleological considerations than is commonly thought.
Fried’s and Guyer’s chapters belong to a handful of other chapters that will
also be of interest to scholars who do not self-identify as Rawlsians. My main
complaint about this Companion is that not more chapters, however valuable in
other respects, have this quality. To be fair, as I mentioned earlier, A Companion to
Rawls is primarily aimed at those working in the Rawlsian tradition. And there
can be no question that as a road map to Rawls’s work, the Companion is a great
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success. Chapters such as Paul Weithman’s on the religious aspect of justice as
fairness, Samuel Freeman’s on the basic structure, or Thomas Hill’s on stability, to
name just a few, showcase the very best of Rawls scholarship. In addition, there are
a number of chapters that offer very helpful guidance to those new to a topic in
Rawlsian political philosophy. I am thinking, for example, of Zofia Stemplowska
and Adam Swift’s excellent chapter on ideal and nonideal theory—a distinction
that has attracted much attention lately—and of Richard Dagger’s chapter on cit-
izenship.
Many chapters, however, will not manage to engage those who are not al-
ready Rawlsians, either because they presuppose too much Rawlsiana or because
they do not go philosophically deep enough to address those who reject Rawls’s
main ideas. I may be wrong about this, of course. But if this were the outcome,
it would betray another of Rawls’s big ideas, namely of aiming at an inclusive,
nonsectarian way of doing political philosophy.
Fabienne Peter
University of Warwick
Martin, Adrienne M. How We Hope: A Moral Psychology.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Pp. 168. $35.00 ðclothÞ.
Hope, like so many other practical attitudes, seems to lend itself to a belief-desire
analysis: I hope for an outcome that I believe to be possible ðor probableÞ and that
I desire to occur. So goes the “orthodox definition of hope,” whose inadequacies
prompt Adrienne Martin to offer a new account of the phenomenon in her book
How We Hope: A Moral Psychology. Martin imagines a pair of cancer patients who
share the relevant beliefs and desires but differ in respect of hope. For Bess, the
possibility that she will be among the 1 percent who gets cured is “what keeps her
going”; whereas Alan, noting how poor a 1 percent chance is, is unwilling to rest
any of his thoughts, feelings, or plans on that slim possibility. How should we cap-
ture the difference in hopefulness between Bess and Alan?
Consider the sometimes physical but often mental forms of agency that are
characteristic expressions of hope and hopefulness. Happily imagining the hoped-
for outcome and planning on the basis of the outcome’s occurrence would be
two paradigmatic examples of such ‘hope-activities’. If Martin is correct, to hope
is to take one’s desire ðfor the outcomeÞ and one’s belief ðas to the likelihood of
its coming aboutÞ to give one reason to engage in hope-activities. Martin charges
the orthodox definition with failing to capture the fact that the person in ques-
tion sees her situation in a way that offers a justificatory rationale for hoping.
Martin calls the rational connection she establishes between, on the one hand,
the belief and desire and, on the other, hope-activities, “incorporation.” She says
that hope involves incorporating both the desire and the belief into one’s ra-
tional agency.
The incorporation of the desire-element involves a familiarly Kantian story
about the possibility of stepping back from some unreasoned attraction and eval-
uating it from the standpoint of practical rationality. Indeed, Martin calls her view
the “incorporation view” as a nod to Henry Allison’s presentation of Kant’s eth-
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